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A LOOKAT THE USE OF ACQUITTED
CONDUCT IN SENTENCING
United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct 633 (1997) (per curiam)
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Watts,1 the United States Supreme Court
addressed whether sentencing courts, when determining a con-
victed defendant's sentence, may consider conduct relating to
charges of which the defendant was acquitted. The Court held
that a "not guilty" verdict does not preclude a sentencing court
from considering the conduct underlying the acquitted charge
so long as that conduct is proved by a preponderance of the
evidence.2 In so doing, the Court resolved a circuit split in
which the Ninth Circuit alone maintained that a sentencing
court may not consider acquitted conduct.3 However, as Justice
Kennedy pointed out in his dissent, the Court left several mat-
ters unresolved.4 For example, the Court did not address con-
cerns about undercutting a verdict of acquittal, the distinction
between uncharged conduct and conduct related to a charge
for which the defendant was acquitted, nor the effect of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 on this issue.5
This Note argues that the Court's decision also ignored im-
portant constitutional considerations. The use of acquitted
conduct in sentencing raises due process and double jeopardy
concerns that deserved far more careful analysis than they re-
ceived. The fundamental differences between uncharged and
acquitted conduct which trigger these constitutional concerns
should have been noted and discussed. Finally, this Note asserts
that the United States Sentencing Commission has the authority
to amend the United States Sentencing Guidelines, even to the
' 117 S. Ct. 633, 634 (1997) (per curiam).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 638. See United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1991).
4 Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 644 (KennedyJ., dissenting).
5 Id. (Kennedy,J., dissenting).
SUPREME COURT REVIEW [Vol. 88
extent it proposes a change contrary to the Court's decision
with regard to acquitted conduct.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES
1. History
Before the promulgation of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines,6 federal judges exercised liberal and virtually unre-
viewable 7 discretion in sentencing.8 Stemming from the differ-
ences in judges' sentencing philosophies, this breadth of
discretion led to a wide unwarranted disparity in sentences im-
posed on defendants convicted of similar crimes.9 While the
federal courts lacked a uniform system of sentencing, many
judges took into account the reality that the defendant typically
would be paroled after serving only one-third of his or her sen-
tence. ° Anticipating parole, these judges regularly sentenced
offenders to much longer terms than they actually intended the
individuals to serve."
Concerned about the implications of incongruous sentenc-
ing results and the uncertainty caused by indeterminate sen-12
tencing, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
6 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1998) [hereinafter USSG]. Hereinaf-
ter, when citing to the USSG I have used the short cite forms recommended by the
manual. See USSG XXXVII.
Since sentencing judges were not required to state the reasons for their sentenc-
ing choices and mostjudges chose not to explain them, there was little on the record
for an appellate court to review. See Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant., 40
UCLA L. REV. 1179, 1187 (1993); WilliamJ. Kirchner, Punishment Despite Acquittal: An
Unconstitutional Aspect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?, 34 ARiz. L. REv. 799, 801
(1992). Hence, it was impossible to discern if the sentencing judge was improperly
influenced. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 55 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing). However, if the reviewing court could determine that a sentence was illegal, or
imposed in an illegal manner, that court could correct it. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35.
8 See Kirchner, supra note 7, at 800; see also William W. Wilkins, Jr., The Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines: Striking an Appropriate Balance, 25 U.C. DAviS L. REv. 571 (1992).
9 See Kirchner, supra note 7, at 800; see also Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing
Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80J. CRIM. L. & CRIM1NOLOGY 883, 895-
97 (1990).
10 See Kirchner, supra note 7, at 801.
Id.
"2 USSG Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro, comment. Under the indeterminate sentencing system,
the sentencing judge had nearly absolute discretion to sentence within a statutorily
defined range (for instance, from two to twenty years). SeeLear, supra note 7, at 1179.
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(the Act) .' By establishing uniform rules to guide the federal
courts in sentencing, Congress hoped the Act would correct the
gross disparities in sentencing, infuse a sense of proportionality,
and restore systemic integrity by requiring courts to impose sen-
tences that offenders would actually serve.14 Toward these ends,
Congress also provided for appellate review of sentencingi5 and
abolished the parole system.' 6
The Act created the United States Sentencing Commission
as an independent agency in the judicial branch . The Com-
mission was "comprised of seven members (including three fed-
eral judges) appointed by the President, confirmed by the
Senate, and instructed to write, by April 1987, sentencing guide-
lines which would automatically take effect six months later un-
less Congress passed another law to the contrary.""'
By contrast, under the Guidelines, the difference between the minimum and maxi-
mum sentence within the applicable range is set at the greater of 25% or six months.
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (2) (1994). For the history of the indeterminate sentencing sys-
tem and the recent shift away from it, see Nagel, supra note 9.
's Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, 98 Stat.
1987 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3359 (1989); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (Supp.
V 1987)).
14 Id. See Kirchner, supra note 7, at 801; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (6) (1994); S.
REP. No. 98-225, at 3850 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.AN. 3221; USSG Ch. 1, Pt.
A, intro, comment.; Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Com-
promises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HoFsRA L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1988) (Congress intended
primarily to create "honesty in sentencing" and to reduce the "unjustifiably wide" sen-
tencing disparity); Lauren Greenwald, Note, Relevant Conduct and the Impact of the Pre-
ponderance Standard of Proof under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Denial of Due
Process, 18 VT. L. REV. 529, 529 (1994) ("These guidelines were designed to bring
honesty, uniformity and proportionality to sentencing.").
'5 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1994). To aid in appellate review, courts are now required to
state, in open court, the reasons for their imposition of a particular sentence. See id.
§ 3553(c).
"6 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212(a), 98
Stat. 1837, 2008-09 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (1988)).
17 See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1994). The Commission issues guidelines and policy
statements pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(a). See USSG, Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro, comment.
'8 Breyer, supra note 14, at 5 (parenthetical in original). See Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984; Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2017-34 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (Supp. IV 1986)). The introduction to the Guide-
lines explains: "The Commission's initial guidelines were submitted to Congress on
April 13, 1987. After the prescribed period of congressional review, the guidelines
took effect on November 1, 1987, and apply to all offenses committed on or after that
date." USSG Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro, comment. See infra note 273 and accompanying text
for amendment process.
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The federal judiciary initially greeted the Guidelines with
hostility.19 It was not until the Supreme Court upheld their con-
stitutionality in United States v. Mistrett20 that the federal courts
began imposing the Guidelines in earnest.
21
2. How the Guidelines Work
Determination of an offender's sentence typically begins
with a recommended sentence from the probation depart-
ment.22 The probation department includes its recommenda-
tion in the pre-sentence investigation report it prepares, in
which it describes the circumstances of the offense and the his-
tory of the offender. A probation officer will determine an of-
fender's sentencing guideline range according to the mandates
limned in the Sentencing Guidelines.24
The Guidelines assign a "base offense level" to each type of
conviction.25 Determining the base offense level is the first step
in calculating an individual's sentencing range.26 To ascertain
19 SeeLear, supra note 7, at 1179 n.2.
488 U.S. 361 (1989). Former Sentencing Commissioner, nowJustice, Breyer ex-
plained:
The Court (in Mistretta] concluded that Congress had not violated the
separation of powers principle by placing the Commission in the judicial
branch, where substantive sentencing decisions and judicial rulemaking
have traditionally been carried out by judges. The Court also concluded
that Congress had not violated the non-delegation doctrine in authorizing
the Commission to promulgate the Guidelines because Congress had pro-
vided "significant statutory direction." Moreover, the Court noted that "de-
veloping proportionate penalties for hundreds of different crimes by a
virtually limitless array of offenders is precisely the sort of intricate, labor-
intensive task for which delegation to an expert body is especially appropri-
ate."
Breyer, supra note 14, at 1 n.3 (internal citations omitted).
21 See Lear, supra note 7, at 1180 n.2.
2 See Kirchner, supra note 7, at 801.
Id. The Guidelines provide that:
A probation officer shall conduct a presentence investigation and report to
the court before the imposition of sentence unless the court finds that
there is information in the record sufficient to enable the meaningful exer-
cise of sentencing authority pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553, and the court ex-
plains this finding on the record. Rule 32(b)(1), FED. 1L CIuM. P. The
defendant may not waive preparation of the presentence report.
USSG § 6Al.1.
2' Kirchner, supra note 7, at 801. Section 1B1.1 outlines the steps to follow in de-
termining a sentencing guideline range. SeeUSSG § 1B1.1 (a)-(i).
2 Kirchner, supra note 7, at 801.
26 m'd
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the base offense level, one must locate the offense in the Guide-
lines Manual2 This can be done by referencing the manual's
statutory index.
The next step is to add the "specific offense characteris-
tics."2 Every offense category carries "specific offense character-
istics" which must be assessed in calculating the base offense
level.3 0 The base offense level is then adjusted to reflect any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that might apply under
the Guidelines. 1 The result is an "adjusted offense level. 32
Finally, in order to find the appropriate guideline range on
the Sentencing Table,3 the probation officer must determine
the defendant's "criminal history category.0 4 The Sentencing
Table is a matrix with forty-three offense levels listed on the ver-
tical axis and six criminal history categories listed on the hori-
zontal axis.3 The point at which the defendant's offense level
and criminal history category meet when plotted on the 258-box
grid shows the recommended sentencing range (in terms of
months of imprisonment) for that individual.36
Once calculated, the probation department gives its rec-
ommendation to the sentencing judge and a sentencing hearing
is held at which both the prosecution and the defendant may
argue whether the probation officer's determinations are cor-
rect. '7 Based on the probation officer's report and the argu-
ments of both parties, the judge ultimately decides the
applicable range under the guidelines.e The judge usually will
2See Breyer, supra-note 14, at 6.
2See id. The statutory index is found in Appendix A of the Guidelines Manual. See
USSG App. A.
"Breyer, supra note 14, at 6. For example, add two levels for money taken, see
USSG § 2B3.1(b)(1), and/or three more levels for use of a gun, see USSG §
2B3.1 (b) (2).
"SeeLear, supra note 7, at 1198.
" See Kirchner, supra note 7, at 802. Such factors may include, for example, the
defendant's "role in the offense," obstructing justice, acceptance of responsibility, or
the vulnerability of the victim. See generally USSG Ch. 3.
32 Kirchner, supra note 7, at 802.
"See USSG Ch. 5, Pt. A, Sentencing Tbl.
"See Kirchner, supra note 7, at 802. Chapter 4 of the Sentencing Guidelines Man-
ual explains the point system used to determine a defendant's criminal history cate-
gory. See USSG Ch. 4, Pt. A.
See USSG Ch. 5, Pt. A, Sentencing Tbl.
See Kirchner, supra note 7, at 802.
'Id. See also USSG § 6AI.3(b).
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select a term from within what she has determined to be the ap-
propriate guideline range; however, she may depart from it if
there is sufficient reason to do So.39 In any event, the judge may
neither exceed the statutory maximum nor fall below the statu-
tory minimum (if one exists) for the crime of conviction.0
3. Relevant Conduct
In 1970, during the era of individualized sentencing, Con-
gress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3661,'4 "which codifies the longstand-
ing principle that sentencing courts have broad discretion to
consider various kinds of information" that may otherwise be
inadmissible as evidence. The Guidelines incorporated the
language of § 3661 into sections 1B1.3 and 1B1.4, which define
relevant conduct under the Guidelines.43 In Witte v. United
States, the Supreme Court explained that the relevant conduct
provisions were "designed to channel the sentencing discretion
of the district courts and to make mandatory the consideration
of factors that previously would have been optional. 
,44
Relevant conduct as explained in the Guidelines describes
the conduct a sentencing judge may take into account when
formulating a sentence.45 It includes an array of activity, usually
"' See Kirchner, supra note 7, at 803. A limited right to depart can be exercised
where factors "not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commis-
sion" exist in a specific case. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994).
'0 See Kirchner, supra note 7, at 802.
4, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, Title X, § 3577, 84
Stat. 922 (1970) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1982), later incorporated into the Act
as 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1988)).
12 United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633, 635 (1997) (per curiam). Section 3661
provides that: "No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a
court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an
appropriate sentence." 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1994).
4 Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 635-36. Although the Guidelines now control judicial discre-
tion, § 3661 is still on the books. Id. at 639 (StevensJ, dissenting).
4' 515 U.S. 389, 402 (1995). SeeUnited States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 441 (1st Cir.
1989) (Breyer, J.) ("very roughly speaking, [relevant conduct] corresponds to those
actions and circumstances that courts typically took into account when sentencing
prior to the Guidelines' enactment").
The Guidelines provide:
Relevant Conduct (Factors that Determine the Guideline Range)
(a) Chapters Two (Offense Conduct) and Three (Adjustments). Unless otherwise
specified, (i) the base offense level where the guideline specifies more
than one base offense level, (ii) specific offense characteristics and (iii)
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considered to be unlawful acts or omissions, that occurred in re-
lation to the offense of conviction (not including the activity
constituting the offense of conviction itself) deemed pertinent
to assessing the defendant's culpability. 46  When determining
the applicable guideline range, a sentencing court may consider
conduct that is neither formally charged nor is an element of
the offense of conviction.47
Uncharged or unadjudicated conduct-acts potentially
characterized as criminal for which the offender's legal guilt has
cross references in Chapter Two, and (iv) adjustments in Chapter
Three, shall be determined on the basis of the following:
(1) (A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, coun-
seled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by
the defendant and
(B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a
criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by
the defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged
as a conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions
of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal ac-
tivity, that occurred during the commission of the offense of
conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of
attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense;
(2) solely with respect to offenses of a character for which §
3D1.2(d) would require grouping of multiple counts, all acts
and omissions described in subdivisions (1) (A) and (1) (B)
above that were part of the same course of conduct or com-
mon scheme or plan as the offense of conviction;
(3) all harm that resulted from the acts and omissions specified in
subsections (a) (1) and (a) (2) above, and all harm that was the
object of such acts and omissions; and
(4) any other information specified in the applicable guideline.
(b) Chapters Four (Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood) and Five (Determin-
ing the Sentence). Factors in Chapters Four and Five that establish the
guideline range shall be determined on the basis of the conduct and in-
formation specified in the respective guidelines.
USSG § 1B1.3 (italicization in the original). See also USSG § 1B1.3, comment. Sec-
tion 1B1.3, which outlines factors that determine the applicable guideline range,
should be distinguished from section 1B1.4, which discusses information that a court
may consider in imposing a sentence within that range. See USSG § 1B1.4, comment.
(backg'd.). USSG § 1B1.4 provides: "In determining the sentence to impose within
the guideline range, or whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted, the
court may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the background,
character, and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law. See 18
U.S.C. § 3661." USSG § 1B1.4; see also USSG § 1B1.4, comment.
"' See Barry L. Johnson, If At First You Don't Succeed-Abolishing the Use of Acquitted
Conduct in Guidelines Sentencing, 75 N.C. L. REV. 153, 159-60 (1996). See Greenwald,
supra note 14, at 539-41, 540 n.51, for cases demonstrating examples of what is con-
sidered relevant conduct by the appellate courts.
47 USSG § 1B1.3, comment. (backg'd.).
816 SUPREME COURT REVIEW [Vol. 88
not been formally adjudicated-clearly falls within this rubric.
However, acquitted conduct is distinct from unadjudicated con-
duct, and less clearly within the court's purview at sentencing.
Acquitted conduct refers to "acts for which the offender was
criminally charged and formally adjudicated not guilty, typically
by the finder of fact after trial.50 Use of acquitted conduct oc-
curs when the sentencing judge relies on such acts as justifica-
tion for enhancing the defendant's sentence.51
A judge must examine conduct surrounding the offense of
conviction to determine whether an increase or decrease in the
sentencing range is warranted.52 Consideration of relevant con-
duct is no longer discretionary but mandatory-a judge's failure
to review relevant conduct is grounds for reversal. 3 Although
the courts regularly consider acquitted conduct within the scope
of relevant conduct for sentencing purposes, whether acquitted
conduct ought to be treated as relevant conduct under the
Guidelines is much debated by scholars. 4
Although the Guidelines contain no specific language
authorizing the use of acquitted conduct in sentencing, the
courts have broadly construed the language and commentary of
sections 1B1.3 and 1B1.4 to allow such evidence. 5s These provi-
sions make clear that the courts may consider a broad range of
conduct for which the defendant was not convicted.56 There is
no limiting language indicating that acquitted conduct should
be treated any differently from other forms of unconvicted con-
SeeJohnson, supra note 46, at 157.
Id. Acquitted conduct is typically considered either as part of the defendant's
relevant conduct used to calculate the guideline sentencing range, or as a basis for
departure-that is, for delivering a sentence beyond the prescribed range. Id.
5 Id
51 Id
52 See USSG §§ 1B1.2(b), 1B1.3(a).
"' See Greenwald, supra note 14, at 530-31. The judge's information for the pur-
poses of sentencing comes from either the trial record or the presentence report
which is compiled by the state. This has the effect of transferring discretion to the
prosecution who, in its discretion, has already decided what is relevant to sentencing
in deciding what information to present to the judge. See id. at 558 (discussing
United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1120 (3d Cir. 1990) (Rosenn, J., concur-
ring)).
"4 See, e.g., Lear, supra note 7; Kirchner, supra note 7; Johnson, supra note 46.
" SeeJohnson, supra note 46, at 162; see also supra note 45 for specific language of
these sections.
" SeeJohnson, supra note 46, at 163.
1998] SENTENCING GUIDELINES &ACQUI7TED CONDUCT 817
duct.57  Furthermore, pre-Guidelines case law predominantly
held that a sentencing judge could consider acts for which the
defendant had not been charged or convicted, including acquit-
ted conduct" Thus, courts can legitimately support their con-
clusions with regard to the use of acquitted conduct in
sentencing, and they have continually done so.- However, the
fact remains that acquitted conduct differs from other uncon-
victed conduct in that it represents a legal conclusion of inno-
cence with regard to the criminality of that conduct.6°
4. Real Offense vs. Charge Offense System
The Sentencing Commission looked at two basic sentencing
models in structuring the Guidelines.1 One, a "charge offense"
system,62 links punishment directly to the offense of conviction.0
The other, a "real offense" system, allows the sentencing judge
to evaluate various other factors-beyond the convicted of-
fense-which are considered a part of the "actual" offense. 64
"See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177, 182 (2d Cir. 1990)
("Traditionally, a sentencing judge exercised broad discretion in considering all rele-
vant information in determining an appropriate sentence, including evidence of un-
charged crimes, dropped counts of a criminal indictment and criminal activity
resulting in acquittal."); United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 609 (3d Cir. 1989);
United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1989). See also United States v.
Johnson, 823 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Bernard, 757 F.2d 1439 (4th
Cir. 1985); United States v. Ray, 683 F.2d 1116 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Morgan, 595 F.2d 1134 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181 (2d Cir.
1972).
"See infra note 82 for examples.
"SeeJohnson, supra note 46, at 193.
61 USSG Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro, comment.
62 This is sometimes called a "conviction-offense" system.
63 SeeLear, supra note 7, at 1192-93. The Guidelines define a "charge offense" sys-
tem as one which bases the offender's sentence upon "the conduct that constitutes
the elements of the offense for which the defendant was charged and of which he was
convicted." USSG Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro, comment.
" See Lear, supra note 7, at 1193. The Guidelines describe a "real offense" system
as one in which sentences are based on "the actual conduct in which the defendant
engaged regardless of the charges for which he was indicted or convicted." USSG Ch.
1, Pt. A, intro, comment. Then-Commissioner Breyer defined a "real offense" system
as one which connects punishment to "the elements of the specific circumstances of
the case." Breyer, supra note 14, at 10.
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Under the charge offense model, punishment is designated
straight from the books.65 To reach the appropriate sentence,
the judge simply looks up the crime of conviction and applies
the prescribed punishment for that crime.66 The drawback to
this system is that it does not take into account the different
ways in which a crime can be committed.67 As a result, it cannot
apportion punishment accordingly.6s For instance, a profes-
sional bank robber who planned for months, carried a gun,
treated his victims cruelly, stole a substantial amount of money
and injured the teller may receive, unless the statute distin-
guishes these differences in defining the crime, the same pun-
ishment as a robber who had no weapon, took little money,
acted impulsively in desperation to feed his children and in-
jured no one-even though arguably the former robber de-
serves a punishment greater than the latter.69 While achieving
procedural fairness, this system fails to achieve substantive jus-
tice.7°
A pure real offense system, by contrast, focuses on the indi-
vidual circumstances of the case and adjusts an offender's sen-
tence accordingly to reflect the specific way in which the offense
was committed. While this system provides a way to differenti-
ate between offenders who engage in meaningfully different
behavior during the course of committing like offenses, it cre-
ates other problems.72 For example, critics contend that itjeop-
ardizes procedural fairness because sentencing is normally
carried out without the limitations of evidentiary procedures.
"' See Breyer, supra note 14, at 9; see also USSG Ch. 1, Pt. A intro, comment. ("A
pure charge offense system would overlook some of the harms that did not constitute
statutory elements of the offenses of which the defendant was convicted.").
See Breyer, supra note 14, at 9.
67 
d.
69 Id.; Lear, supra note 7, at 1204; USSG Ch.1, Pt. A, intro, comment.
70 See Breyer, supra note 14, at 9-10.
71 See id. at 10; see also USSG Oh. 1, Pt. A, intro, comment. ("A pure real offense sys-
tem would sentence on the basis of all identifiable conduct.").
72 See Lear, supra note 7, at 1204; Breyer, supra note 14, at 11.
See Breyer, supra note 14, at 11. Some feel a pure real offense system also jeop-
ardizes constitutional rights. See, e.g., Elizabeth T. Lear, Double Jeopardy, The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, and the Subsequent-Prosecution Dilemma, 60 BROOKLYN L. REv. 725,
741 n.67 (1994) ("Real-offense sentencing allows the government to obtain punish-
ment for a criminal offense without adhering to the affirmative commands of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments.").
[Vol. 88
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Additionally, a sentencing judge applies a lower standard of
proof than is required by ajury verdict on the offense of convic-
tion in a trial where the evidentiary rules structure what is ad-
missible for the jury to consider.74 Hence, there is little to
constrain the judge's discretion. Thus, in the case of our two
bank robbers, each may get a different sentence, but those sen-
tences will be completely discretionary and beyond the reach of
many procedural constraints that usually protect the defen-
dant.7
The Sentencing Commission embraced neither a pure real
offense nor a pure charge offense system.76 Instead it adopted
what former United States Sentencing Commissioner Ilene H.
Nagel characterized as a "modified real offense" system. This
model looks first to the offense charged to assign a "base offense
evel."78 It then accounts for "real" factors by listing categories
of general adjustments and modifications for mitigating and ag-
gravating circumstances, and by considering the criminal history
of the offender.? The Guidelines control which real factors a
judge may consider and how each factor weighs into the equa-
tion that generates the final sentence. Thus, they considerably
narrow the breadth of discretion the pre-Guidelines courts ex-
ercised with regard to real offense factors. 0 The Commission
chose this system as a workable compromise which best ad-
vanced its goals of attaining both procedural and substantive
fairness.8
71 See Breyer, supra note 14, at 11.
7- The Supreme Court endorsed real-offense sentencing in Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241, 251 (1949), finding nothing in the Due Process Clause to limit ajudge's
discretion with regard to uncharged and unproved conduct. The Court concluded
that sentencing decisions were outside the constitutional framework established for
trials. Id.
76 SeeJohnson, supra note 46, at 161-62.
"See id. at 161; see also Nagel, supra note 9, at 925.
7See Breyer, supra note 14, at 11-12. Additionally, for some offenses there is a
mandatory statutory minimum sentence and for all offenses there is a statutory
maximum. Thus, the perimeters function on a conviction-based system.
79id.
SeeLear, supra note 7, at 1194.
81 See Breyer, supra note 14, at 8-12. This system has been criticized for shifting dis-
cretion to prosecutors, thus opening the door to prosecutorial abuse. See Greenwald,
supra note 14, at 530-31 n.12; Lear, supra note 7, at 1205-06. The argument is that it is
easier for prosecutors to obtain punishment for a given offense at sentencing under a
lower burden of proof and unrestricted by the rules of evidence, than to secure a
conviction at trial; consequently, they will choose to prosecute only for the simplest
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B. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
With the exception of the Ninth Circuit, the United States
Courts of Appeals have held that a sentencing court may prop-
erly consider acquitted conduct in determining a defendant's
sentence.2 The Ninth Circuit alone has maintained, since a di-
vided holding in United States v. Brady,83 that a sentencing judge
may not consider acquitted conduct.84
The defendant in Brady was charged with first degree mur-
der and assault with intent to commit murder.s5 The jury found
him guilty of the lesser included offenses of voluntary man-
slaughter and assault with a dangerous weapon.86 The proba-
tion department calculated a sentencing guideline range of fifty-
one to sixty-three months."' After first adjusting the range un-
der the Guidelines to satisfy his understanding of the facts, the
judge fully departed from the guideline range and sentenced
Brady to 180 months imprisonment.8 Contrary to and despite
the jury's verdict, the judge believed that Brady had intention-
ally tried to kill his victims and sentenced him accordingly."9
Brady appealed.9°
crime and rely on the sentencing hearing to extract punishment for other criminal
activity without pursuing a conviction. Lear, supra note 7, at 1206.
82 United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633, 634 (1997) (per curiam). See United States
v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Coleman, 947 F.2d 1424
(10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rivera-Lopez, 928 F.2d 372 (11th Cir. 1991) (per
curiam); United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1990); United
States v. Fonner, 920 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Dawn, 897 F.2d 1444
(8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1989); United States
v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Isom, 886 F.2d 736 (4th Cir.
1989); United States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v.
McGhee, 882 F.2d 1095 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Restrepo, 884 F.2d 1294 (9th
Cir. 1989). The dissent in Watts points out that, despite these circuit decisions, there
is still ongoing vigorous debate among judges in the courts of appeals on this issue.
Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 641 n.3 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
" 928 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1991). Warning against creating a split among the cir-
cuits, Chief Judge Wallace dissented. Id. at 854-55 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting). Sen-
tencing courts, he argued, traditionally have been allowed to consider conduct other
than the offense of conviction in sentencing and Congress did not intend to change
that practice in enacting the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 855 (Wallace, C.J., dissent-
ing).
84 See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 634.
Brady, 928 F.2d at 845.
86Id. at 845-46.
8' Id. at 846.
89 Id.
90Id.
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Acknowledging the substantial contrary precedent in other
circuits, the Ninth Circuit nonetheless held that a sentencing
judge could not reconsider facts rejected by the jury's verdict of
acquittal.9' The court found it unacceptable to allow a defen-
dant to suffer punishment for a criminal charge on which the
defendant had been acquitted.92
The Ninth Circuit explained that although the Guidelines
permit sentencing courts to consider relevant conduct beyond
the count of conviction, it does not follow that acquitted con-
duct is included within the type of conduct that may be consid-
ered.93 The court felt that examination of acquitted conduct
improperly permits ajudge to circumvent the jury's verdict. 4 In
subsequent cases addressing the issue of the use of acquitted
conduct in sentencing, the Ninth Circuit followed its reasoning
in Brady to reach the same conclusion that use of acquitted
conduct in sentencing is improper.9 Every other circuit, in con-
trast, has continued to reach the opposite resule 6 offering ar-
guments similar to those the Supreme Court made in United
States v. Watts.7
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. DEFENDANT VERNON WATTS
During a probation search of Vernon Watts' residence,
conducted in accordance with California law, police found
crack cocaine in a kitchen cabinet and two loaded firearms and
ammunition in a bedroom closet.9 s
The probation search occurred because John Demmel,
Watts' probation officer, had learned that Watts was not living




'Id. at 851-52. Although Brady argued that the sentencing court's approach con-
tained constitutional defects, the appellate court did not reach these issues because it
decided the matter on statutory grounds. Id. at 852 n.14.
95 SeeUnited States v. Watts, 67 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Putra, 78
F.3d 1386 (9th Cir. 1996).
9See supra note 83.
97117 S. Ct. 633 (1997) (per curiam). The Court's reasoning is discussed infra Part
IV.
"Watts, 67 F.3d at 793.
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girlfriend Sonja Lee and selling cocaine. 99 As a result, Demmel
placed Watts under surveillance.' ° Shortly thereafter, police ob-
served evidence of drug trafficking, stopped Watts, and
searched his car.'0 ' They found a set of keys and a garage door
opener to Ms. Lee's home.0 2 The police then proceeded to Ms.
Lee's residence. They let themselves in with Watts' key and
conducted a probation search in accordance with California
law.10 4 The search uncovered crack cocaine in a kitchen cabinet
and two loaded firearms and ammunition in a bedroom
closet.05 Ms. Lee admitted to the police that she and Watts lived
there together.0 ° Watts then admitted ownership of the drugs
and guns.0 7
Watts was subsequently indicted for possession with intent
to distribute cocaine base (crack), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a) (1),'0 8 and for using a firearm in relation to a drug of-
fense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).10 At trial, ajury con-
"Id. at 792. A confidential informant gave this information to a Detective James
Cooper who passed it along to Demmel. Id.
100 Id.
... I& at 793.
102 Ia
103 i
"4 Id In California, probationers are lawfully subject to warrantless searches of
their property. Id. at 792.
' Id. at 793.
106 ad
107 a
0 Id In pertinent part, § 841 states: "(a) Unlawful acts. Except as authorized by
this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally-(l) to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distrib-
ute, or dispense, a controlled substance .... " 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) (1994).
10 Watts, 67 F.3d at 793. In pertinent part, § 924 provides:
Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime which provides for
an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous
weapon or device) ... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punish-
ment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced
to imprisonment for five years, and if the firearm is a short-barreled rifle, short-
barreled shotgn, or semiautomatic assault weapon, to imprisonment for ten
years, and if tle firearm is a machinegun, or a destructive device, or is equipped
with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to imprisonment for thirty years. In
the case of his second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, such per-
son shall be sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years, and if the firearm is a
machinegun, or a destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or
firearm muffler, to life imprisonment without release. Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, the court shall not place on probation or suspend the sen-
tence of any person convicted of a violation of this subsection, nor shall the term
of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run concurrently with any other
term of imprisonment including that imposed for the crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime in which the firearm was used or carried.
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victed Watts on the narcotics charge, but acquitted him on the
weapons count.110 At sentencing, however, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of California found by a
preponderance of the evidence that "Watts had possessed the
guns in connection with the drug offense.""' Accordingly, de-
spite Watts' acquittal on the firearms charge, the district court,
in calculating Watts' sentence pursuant to the Sentencing
Guidelines, added two points to his base offense level for posses-
112sion of a weapon during the offense of conviction.
The district court sentenced Watts to 262 months in prison
to be followed by 60 months of supervised release. Watts ap-
pealed both his conviction and his sentence to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. 4 The Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction,
but vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing.m
The Ninth Circuit found that the "only difference" between
USSG § 2Dl.1 (b) (1) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is the assignment
and standard of the burden of proof regarding the connection
between the firearm and the predicate offense.11 6 In United
States v. Brady,'17 the court held that "a sentencing judge may
not, 'under any standard of proof,' rely on the facts of which the
defendant was acquitted."1 8 Following its own precedent, the
Ninth Circuit rejected the Government's argument that the dis-
trict court could have enhanced Watts' sentence under § 2Dl.1
without considering facts "necessarily rejected" by the jury's ac-
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (1994).
,,o Watts, 67 F.3d at 793.
... United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633, 634 (1997) (per curiam).
1 Id. In referring to drug offenses involving the unlawful manufacturing, import-
ing, exporting, or trafficking (including possession with intent to commit these of-
fenses), attempt or conspiracy this section provides: "Specific Offense Characteristics
(1) If a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed, increase by 2 levels."
USSG § 2Dl.1 (b) (1).
" Watts, 67 F.3d at 793.
n Id. at 792.
11 Id. Watts had contested the lawfulness of the probation search and hence the
admissibility of the evidence gained from that search at trial. Id. at 793-95. However,
this issue was not taken up by the Supreme Court. There is thus no need to give it
further attention here.
..6 Id. at 797. Both punish the defendant for possession of a firearm in connection
with the crime of conviction, but the burden of proof for substantive criminal charges
is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-62 (1970),
whereas the burden of proof for sentencing purposes is only a preponderance of the
evidence, see McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 86-89 (1986).
"' United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1991).
18 Watts, 67 F.3d at 797 (citing Brady, 928 F.2d at 851 & n.12).
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quittal on the § 924(c) charge. 9 The Government explained
that the statute requires a defendant to have used a firearm in
relation to, or to facilitate, an offense; whereas the enhance-
ment merely requires that a defendant possessed a weapon dur-
ing the offense.12 0 Thus, argued the Government, the jury could
have acquitted Watts on the statutory charge believing he pos-
sessed a firearm but that the firearm was not connected to the
offense. 21  Finding the Government's reasoning unpersuasive,
the Ninth Circuit maintained that a jury's acquittal on a more
serious count bound the sentencing judge: "[W]e would pervert
our system of justice if we allowed a defendant to suffer pun-
ishment for a criminal charge for which he or she was acquit-
ted.
, 122
B. DEFENDANT CHERYL ANN PUTRA
Surveillance officers documented two transactions in which
Cheryl Ann Putra and codefendant Vassilios Liaskos, a major
drug dealer, sold cocaine to a government informant.123 Among
other allegations, Putra's indictment charged her with aiding
and abetting in the crime of possession with intent to distribute
11 Id
120 Id Watts was decided before Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501, 505 (1995), in
which the Supreme Court held that to sustain a conviction under § 924(c) (1), the
Government must show "an active employment of the firearm by the defendant, a use
that makes the firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense." Id at
503. Under Bailey, it is not enough to show mere possession of a firearm by a person
who commits a drug offense. Id. at 506. Watts, however, was acquitted under the pre-
Bailey standard that required only that the firearm was "within the possession or con-
trol of the defendant and available to him thus emboldening him to commit the un-
derlying offense." United States v. Watts, 79 F.3d 768, 769 (9th Cir. 1996). In a pre-
Bailey regime, a person could be convicted under § 924(c) (1) for mere possession.
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Watts is more persuasive in a pre-Bailey situation
where, if ajury found possession, it could convict under § 924. At a minimum, under
the pre-Bailey interpretation of the statute, acquittal shows that the Government failed
to establish possession beyond a reasonable doubt. In contrast, in a post-Bailey case,
the jury, even if it found possession, could not convict unless it also found that the
firearm had been actively employed. Thus, it would be unclear if the jury was acquit-
ting because it did not believe a defendant actively employed a firearm, or because it
did not believe the defendant possessed one at all.
121 Watts, 67 F.3d at 797.
'22 Id (quoting United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 1991)).
123 United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633, 634 (1997) (per curiam). See also United
States v. Putra, 78 F.3d 1386, 1391 (9th Cir. 1996) (Wallace, C.J., dissenting); United
States v. Putra, No. 94-10040, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 5234, at *3 (9th Cir. Mar. 5,
1996); Government's Petition for Certiorari at 5, United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633
(1997) (No. 95-1906).
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one ounce of cocaine on May 8, 1992, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a) (1)124 and 18 U.S.C. § 2;12 and with aiding and abetting in
possession with intent to distribute five ounces of cocaine on
May 9, 1992, in violation of the same statutes.26
Before the United States District Court for the District of
Hawaii, a jury convicted Putra of the May 8th incident, but ac-
quitted her with regard to the activities of May 9th.27 At sen-
tencing, however, the district court determined by a
preponderance of the evidence that Putra did, in fact, partici-
pate in the May 9th transaction.' 28 Explaining that Putra's in-
volvement in the May 9th transaction constituted "relevant
conduct" under USSG § 1B1.3, the district court aggregated the
drug amounts from both sales in calculating her base offense
level under the Guidelines.9' Arriving at a guideline range of
twenty-seven to thirty-three months imprisonment, the court
sentenced Putra to twenty-seven months in prison to be fol-
lowed by thirty-six months supervised release. 30 Had the jury
originally found Putra guilty of the May 9th crimes, the sentenc-
ing guideline range would have been twenty-seven to thirty-
three months.' By contrast, had the district court not added
the cocaine from the May 9th charge, the guideline range
would have been fifteen to twenty-one months imprisonment.
3 2
Putra appealed both her conviction and her sentence to the
Ninth Circuit.'3 The appellate court affirmed her conviction,
along with the convictions of her codefendants, in an unpub-
lished memorandum disposition. However, in a separate
opinion, the Ninth Circuit vacated her sentence and remanded
for resentencing.1ss The court acknowledged that under § 1B1.3
124 See supra note 108 for statutory language.
2 This section provides in pertinent part that: "Whoever commits an offense
against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its
commission, is punishable as a principal." 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1994).




2 1& For the text of § B 1.3, see supra note 45.
120 Government's Petition for Certiorari at 5, Watts (No. 95-1906).
1 d,
12 Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 640.
'$United States v. Putra, 78 F.3d 1386, 1386 (9th Cir. 1996).
m United States v. Putra, No. 94-10040, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 5234 (9th Cir. Mar.
5, 1996).
15 Putra, 78 F.3d at 1386.
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it is proper to include the total quantity of drugs involved in the
same course of conduct even if the defendant is only convicted
of one count.136 Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit insisted that
USSG § 1Bl.3 addresses only uncharged conduct and does not
apply to a situation where the defendant is charged with, and
acquitted of, the other count involved.'3 7 Once again, relying on
Brady's holding that the Guidelines do not permit "'a court to
reconsider facts during sentencing that have been rejected by a
jury's not guilty verdict,",138 the Ninth Circuit concluded that al-
lowing an increase in Putra's sentence would render the jury's
findings of fact pointless and would effectively punish her for an
offense for which she was acquitted.39 The panel noted that
Brady creates "a judicial limitation on the facts the district court
may consider at sentencing, beyond any limitation imposed by
the Guidelines."
140
Then-ChiefJudge Clifford Wallace filed an emphatic dissent
concluding that the majority opinion "contradicts the Guide-
lines, our practice prior to enactment of the Guidelines, deci-
sions of other circuits, and recent Supreme Court authority."4
Chief Judge Wallace argued that it is reasonable to infer that
USSG § 1B1.3 encompasses acquitted conduct.42 In support of
his view, he pointed to language found in the background note
to that section and to the judiciary's pre-Guidelines practice of
reviewing a wide range of evidence in sentencing, including ac-
quitted conduct.4 3  Chief Judge Wallace acknowledged that
Brady and its progeny diverged from this common practice, set-
ting a different precedent in the Ninth Circuit. 44 But, he stated,
Brady has been undermined by the Supreme Court's decision in
Id. at 1390. See USSG § 1B1.3 comment. (n.3).
,s Putra, 78 F.3d at 1388-89.
Id. at 1389 (quoting United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 1991)).
See supra notes 82-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of Brady.
... Putra, 78 F.3d at 1389.
140 Id
.. I. at 1390 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting).
" Id. (Wallace, C.J., dissenting).
1 Putra, 78 F.3d at 1390-92 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting). See USSG § 1B1.3, com-
ment. (backg'd.) ("Conduct that is not formally charged or is not an element of the
offense of conviction may enter into the determination of the applicable guideline
sentencing range.").
' Putra, 78 F.3d at 1393 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting).
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Witte v. United States' and therefore "must not be considered as
continuing circuit authority."
46
The Ninth Circuit denied the Government's requests for
rehearing in both Watts and Putra.4 7 The Government then
filed a single petition for certiorari to the United States Su-
preme Court seeking review of both cases.1 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether a sentencing
court may consider the conduct of a defendant's underlying
charges of which he or she has been acquitted. 9
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. PER CURIAM OPINION
In this unsigned opinion, the Court held that a sentencing
judge may consider, in determining the defendant's sentence,
conduct of which the defendant has been acquitted, if that con-
duct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 50 In
finding that ajudge's review of acquitted conduct in sentencing
determinations violates neither the federal Sentencing Guide-
lines nor the United States Constitution, the Court reversed two
panels of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.5 '
The Court first pointed to 18 U.S.C. § 3661, which codifies
the canon that courts have broad discretion to consider various
kinds of information at sentencing. s2 Citing Wlliams v. New
York, 5 the Court asserted that it has already embraced the prin-
ciples embodied in § 3661.54 Prior to the promulgation of the
Sentencing Guidelines, sentencing courts were allowed to take
into account "facts introduced at trial relating to other charges,
'" 515 U.S. 389 (1995) (holding that the use of relevant conduct to increase the
punishment for a charged offense does not punish the offender for the relevant con-
duct within the meaning of the DoubleJeopardy Clause).
.4 Putra, 78 F.3d at 1393 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting).
v See United States v. Watts, 79 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Putra,
110 F.3d 705 (9th Cir. 1997).
'" Government's Petition for Certiorari, Watts (No. 95-1906).
"9 United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633, 634 (1997) (per curiam). Supreme Court
Rule 12.4 allows for the combination of cases for review where the questions are
"identical or closely related." See SuP. Cr. R. 12.4.
"0 Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 638.
"' I& at 634.
,12 Id. at 635. See supra note 42 for relevant language of § 3661.
337 U.S. 241 (1949).
"' Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 635.
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even ones of which the defendant was acquitted.' 55 The Guide-
lines, argued the Court, did not alter this aspect of a sentencing
court's discretion.'56 In fact, § 1B1.4 of the Guidelines adopted
the same philosophy laid out in § 3661.' 57 Furthermore, the
sweeping language of § 1B1.3, and the explanations offered in
its accompanying commentary and background notes, support
the conclusion that the Sentencing Commission contemplated
acquitted conduct as relevant conduct and hence appropriate to
consider at sentencing.
5 8
The Court then responded to the dissent's argument that,
in view of its statutory directive to provide incremental punish-
ment for multiple offenses,'5 9 Congress could not have intended
for the Guidelines to increase sentences based on acquitted
conduct.'r The Court stressed that § 994(1) does not preclude
the sentencing court from considering uncharged or acquitted
conduct. 6 ' Rather, it merely mandates that the Guidelines in-
crease the penalties when defendants are convicted of multiple
offenses. 62
Next, the Court addressed the Ninth Circuit's concern that
consideration of acquitted conduct punishes a defendant for a
criminal charge for which he or she has been found "not
guilty.' 63 In response, the Court offered the explanation it ar-
ticulated in Witte v. United States:.64 "sentencing enhancements
do not punish a defendant for crimes of which he was not con-





,' &Id at 635-36. For example, the Court characterized Putra's position as para-
digmatic of the § 1B1.3 Application Note 3, which reads:
[W] here the defendant engaged in three drug sales of 10, 15, and 20 grams of
cocaine, as part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan, sub-
section (a) (2) provides that the total quantity of cocaine involved (45 grams) is
to be used to determine the offense level even if the defendant is convicted of a
single count charging only one of the sales.
Id. (quoting USSG § 1B1.3 comment. (n.3)).
,"9 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(1) (1994).




264 515 U.S. 389 (1995).
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victed, but rather increase his sentence because of the manner
in which he committed the crime of conviction. ' 10
With regard to the preclusive effect of an acquittal, the
Court found that the Ninth Circuit "failed to appreciate the sig-
nificance of the different standards of proof that govern at trial
and sentencing" in asserting that the jury rejects some facts
when it returns a not guilty verdict.lee An acquittal on criminal
charges, explained the Court, "does not prove that the defen-
dant is innocent; it merely proves the existence of a reasonable
doubt as to his guilt."16 7 Citing Chief Judge Wallace's dissent in
the Ninth Circuit's Putra decision, the Court emphasized that
there is no way to know a jury's specific reasons for acquittal on
any charge, and therefore it cannot be said that the jury re-
jected any particular facts by its verdict. 16e The Court indicated
that, under the Guidelines, facts relevant to sentencing need be
proved only by a preponderance of the evidence.10 Moreover,
that standard has passed due process inspection!7 0
Concluding that a 'jury's verdict of acquittal does not pre-
vent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying
the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved
by a preponderance of the evidence," the Court reversed both
Putra and Watts and remanded the cases for further proceedings
consistent with its opinion.
165 Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 636 (citing Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995)). The
Ninth Circuit did not describe the problem as one of double jeopardy in its analysis.
See United States v. Watts, 67 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Putra, 78 F.3d
1386 (9th Cir. 1996). However, the Supreme Court labeled it as such and answered it
accordingly. See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 636.
16 Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 637.
'6' Id. (quoting United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361
(1984)).
1 Id.
id. The Court acknowledged a divergence among the circuit courts as to
whether in extreme cases, where relevant conduct would dramatically increase a de-
fendant's sentence, a clear and convincing standard ought to be employed. Id. How-
ever, the Court declined to address that issue here, as the instant case did not present
such "exceptional circumstances." Id.
"0Id. The Court ruled on this point in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92
(1986), holding that the preponderance of evidence standard at sentencing generally
satisfies due process.
' Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 638. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit
accepted that Brady was wrongly decided; withdrew the majority published opinion in
Putra; adopted the reasoning of the prior dissent; and affirmed the district court's
sentence which considered Putra's acquitted conduct in determining her offense
level. See United States v. Putra, 110 F.3d 705, 705-06 (9th Cir. 1997).
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B. JUSTICE BREYER'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Breyer joined the Court's per curiam opinion, writ-
ing separately to note that the Court's decision "poses no obsta-
cle to the [Sentencing] Commission itself deciding whether or
not to enhance a sentence on the basis of conduct that a sen-
tencingjudge concludes did take place, but in respect to which
a jury acquitted the defendant.' ' 172 While Justice Breyer agreed
that the Guidelines do not include any specific exception for
acquitted conduct under its sentencing directives pertaining to
relevant conduct, he asserted that the Sentencing Commission
has the authority to amend the Guidelines so as to instruct the
sentencing judge not to consider acquitted conduct.
17 3
C. JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRENCE
In contrast to the sentiment expressed in Justice Breyer's
concurrence, Justice Scalia strongly disagreed with the proposi-
tion that the Sentencing Commission could effectively reverse
the Supreme Court by electing to modify the Guidelines.' 4 Jus-
tice Scalia maintained that 28 U.S.C. § 924(b) (1), 17 read in con-
junction with 18 U.S.C. § 3661,176 prohibits the Commission, as
well as the courts, from declaring that acquitted conduct may
not be considered for sentencing purposes. 7 7 If the Commis-
sion seeks change in this regard, argued Justice Scalia, it must
'78submit its recommendations to Congress.
D. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the per cu-
riam decision on several fronts, including the Court's cursory
treatment of the case.'7 Unlike Justice Kennedy's dissent which
mostly objected to the Court's procedure,' Justice Stevens took
issue with the merits of the majority's conclusion.' To begin
172 Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 638 (BreyerJ., concurring).
172 Id at 638-39 (Breyer, J., concurring).
174 Id at 638 (Scalia,J., concurring).
'7' Section 924(b) (1) requires the Guidelines to be "consistent with all pertinent
provisions of Title 18, United States Code." 28 U.S.C. § 924 (b)(1) (1994).
1'76 See supra note 42 for specific language of§ 3661.
177 Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 638 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
178 Id. (ScaliaJ., concurring).
179 Id- at 639 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
18"0 See infra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
181 Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 639 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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with, Justice Stevens challenged the majority's reliance on 18
U.S.C. § 3661.182 He contended that, while § 3661 clearly allows
judges to consider otherwise inadmissible evidence in the exer-
cise of their sentencing discretion, it does not address questions
of relevance or weight of that evidence.8 3 Nor, he continued,
does it "shed [any] light on whether the district judges' applica-
tion of the Guidelines in the manner presented in these cases
was authorized by Congress, or is allowed by the Constitution."
14
Justice Stevens pointed out that the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 confined the discretion of sentencing judges to a set of
uniform rules." The Guidelines, he continued, already pro-
scribe reliance on certain kinds of evidence in sentencing with-
out offending § 3661 because the statute does not command
that any particular weight, or any weight at all, be given to any
particular type of evidence.18 6 Furthermore, Justice Stevens as-
serted, the broad inclusive language of § 3661 found in the
Guidelines relates only to the sections where the judge retains
discretion.187 To the extent that judges exercise discretion in
determining a sentence within the prescribed guideline range,
Justice Stevens agreed that reference to acquitted conduct was
acceptable."" However, he concluded, with regard to calculat-
ing the appropriate guideline range, judges ought not consider
acquitted conduct because doing so would produce perverse re-
sults.8 9 As an example of such a result, Justice Stevens demon-
strated that Putra's sentence as calculated with the
enhancement based on acquitted conduct was the same as it
would have been if she had been convicted of the second
count.19°
Then Justice Stevens attacked the Court's application of the
case law upon which its decision relied.' 9' First, he discredited
the usefulness of Williams v. New York 92 on the grounds that: (1)
12 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens,J, dissenting).
Id. at 639-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 639 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"6 Id. (Stevens,J, dissenting).
117 Id. at 640 (StevensJ., dissenting).
"' Id. (Stevens,J, dissenting).
... Id. at 641 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
"0 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
... Id (StevensJ., dissenting).
" '337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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the case involved the exercise of discretion within an authorized
range, not with the definition of that range; (2) the case did not
challenge the judge's statements or the applicable standard of
proof at sentencing before the court; and (3) the pre-
Guidelines regime under which the Williams court operated was
based on an entirely different rationale.9
Justice Stevens also discounted the holding in McMillan v.
Pennsylvania,'M calling it a "misguided five-to-four decision.' 95
According to Stevens, McMillan is unpersuasive because the sen-
tence imposed was within the range that would have been avail-
able without the enhancement. 196 Furthermore, he explained,
McMillan dealt only with the constitutionality of a pellucid
Pennsylvania statute, not with the federal Sentencing Guide-
lines.
9 7
Next Justice Stevens distinguished Watts from Witte,198 where
the Court specifically limited its holding to the context of dou-
ble jeopardy.'99 By contrast, the issue here, he declared, is not
whether the defendants were punished or prosecuted twice for
the same crime, but whether the initial punishment was cor-
rectly and constitutionally imposed. °°
Additionally, Justice Stevens focused on the multiple offense
aspect of Putra's case.20' Explaining that 28 U.S.C. § 994(1) di-
rects the Commission to provide for incremental punishment
for multiple offenses of which a defendant is convicted, he ex-
pressed his inability to square this mandate with the majority's
conclusion that Congress also intended incremental punish-
ment for each of the offenses of which the defendant was ac-
quitted.0
In conclusion, Justice Stevens invoked the constitutional
command that criminal charges be sustained by proof beyond a
... Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 641 (StevensJ, dissenting).
', 477 U.S. 79 (1986). Note thatJustice Stevens dissented in McMillan. Id at 95
(Stevens,J., dissenting).
'95 Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 642 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
'1 Id. (StevensJ, dissenting).
197 Id (StevensJ., dissenting).
.Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995).
"9 Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 643 (StevensJ, dissenting).
Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
o Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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reasonable doubt.2 3 The Guidelines, he argued, ought to be
construed in accordance with this protected procedural re-
quirement because "[t]he notion that a charge that cannot be
sustained by proof beyond a reasonable doubt may give rise to
the same punishment as if it had been so proved is repugnant to
thatjurisprudence.
Justice Stevens supported Justice Breyer's conclusion that
the Sentencing Commission has authority to disallow the con-
sideration of acquitted conduct by amending the Guidelines to
reflect that decision. 5 On that matter, he added, the Commis-
sion could mandate a greater burden of proof at sentencing if it
so chose.s
E. JUSTICE KENNEDYS DISSENT
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy expressed his disapproval of
207the Court's handling of the case. He asserted that the case
should have been set for full briefing and oral argument. 8 Jus-
tice Kennedy expressed his displeasure with the Court's ap-
proach in three particular areas. First, he felt the Court merely
shrugged off the distinction between uncharged conduct and
conduct related to a charge for which the defendant was acquit-
ted-a distinction that should have been confronted by rea-
soned discourse.2 9. Next he argued that the Court should have
addressed the concerns raised by Justice Stevens and other fed-
eral judges with regard to undercutting the verdict of acquit-
tal-even if the Court could do no more than acknowledge a
"theoretical contradiction from which [it] cannot escape be-
cause of overriding practical considerations."210  Finally, in
agreement with Justice Stevens, and in light of Justice Scalia's
and Justice Breyer's differing views on the Sentencing Commis-
sion's role, Justice Kennedy contended that the effect of the
Id. at 644 (Stevens,J., dissenting). See In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
2' Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 644 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
" Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
"6 Id. (Stevens,J, dissenting).
I. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id (KennedyJ, dissenting).
Id. (Kennedy,J., dissenting).
21 Id. (Kennedy,J., dissenting).
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Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 deserved further exploration by
the Court."'
V. ANALYSIS
In United States v. Watts, the Supreme Court ignored the
crucial distinction between uncharged conduct and acquitted
conduct, and in so doing turned its back on relevant constitu-
tional concerns. The encroachment on constitutional rights re-
sulting from the use of acquitted conduct in sentencing
outweighs the arguments for permitting the use of acquitted
conduct in sentencing. Furthermore, the policy implications of
a judge's power to undercut the jury's verdict will undermine
finality and faith in the American criminal justice system. This
Note will first consider the policy concerns raised by the use of
acquitted conduct in sentencing before turning to the constitu-
tional issues.
A. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The Watts Court lumped acquitted conduct together with all
the other types of relevant information a court may consider for.• 212
the purposes of sentencing. The Court insisted judges have
always been free to consider a wide range of information, in-
cluding acquitted conduct.2 3 Be that as it may, it does not make
it right.214 (After all, judges once were able to sentence people
to the stockades, too.2 5) Allowing sentencing judges to enhance
sentences based on conduct underlying a charge for which the
defendant has been acquitted undermines the jury's verdict and
its role in the criminal justice system. 6
211 See id. (KennedyJ., dissenting).
212 Id. at 636.
213 Id. at 635. The Court cited Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), a case
dealing with the sentencing court's reliance on unconvicted conduct, and United
States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 590 (D.C. Cir. 1982), to argue that under the pre-
Guideline sentencing regime it was "well established that a sentencing judge may take
into account facts introduced at trial relating to other charges, even ones of which the
defendant has been acquitted." Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 635.
214 See Lear, supra note 7, at 1185 ("Tradition is no substitute for constitutionality;
the steadfastness with which the courts have proclaimed the constitutionality of non-
conviction offense sentencing should not deter its re-examination.").
2" For a less trite example, see Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (re-
versing as unconstitutional the "separate but equal" doctrine, which had been the law
of the land for over half a century).
216 SeeJohnson, supra note 46, at 180.
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While the Guidelines explicitly allow the use of conduct
"that is not formally charged or is not an element of the offense
of conviction,"2 it is wrong to equate these kinds of conduct
with acquitted conduct. In the American criminal justice system
an acquittal carries special weight.218 It communicates a message
about the defendant's legal innocence that cannot be found in
the mere absence of a conviction.1 9 It tells the community that
the individual is not guilty of the crime for which he or she was
charged.
The Watts Court explained that one cannot know exactly
why a jury found a defendant not guilty: "[A]cquittal on crimi-
nal charges does not prove that the defendant is innocent; it
merely proves the existence of reasonable doubt as to his
guilt., 220 However, using the Court's own logic, one can as easily
conclude that a verdict may, in fact, mean that the jury would
have found the defendant completely innocent under any stan-
dard of proof. The presumption of innocence is firmly embed-
ded in the American criminal justice system and should not be
taken lightly.2 21 When ajury acquits, that presumption remains
intact.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the
right to a trial by jury.2 22 As one commentator explained, "[t] he
Constitution places the jury at the heart of the criminal justice
system as the fundamental guarantor of individual liberty.,
2 3
Granting sentencing courts the right to review acquitted con-
27 USSG § 1B1.3, comment. (backg'd.).
211 See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978) (noting that "the law attaches
particular significance to an acquittal").
"'Johnson, supra note 46, at 194.
United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633, 637 (1997) (per curiam) (quoting Untied
States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984)).
2" See, e.g., In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) ("[A] fundamental value deter-
mination of our society [is] that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let
a guilty man go free.").
2'2 The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONSr. amend. VI.
" Lear, supra note 7, at 1185 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also id. at
1225 ("The drafters of the Constitution ... expectaed] that [the jury] would play an
active and important role in safeguarding American liberty.").
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duct enables the government to bypass the trial system with its
224accompanying constitutional protections. Because it eviscer-
ates the jury's ability to protect the citizen from government
overreaching, this approach upsets the jury's crucial balancing
role. 25 Furthermore, it "in effect, tells the jury (and the public
in general) that the jury's efforts in assessing the evidence and
weighing the different charges were of limited importance,
overridden by the contrary opinion of one judge."226 In so do-
ing, it not only diminishes the democratic nature of the crimi-
nal justice system, it undermines public confidence in the
judicial system.227
B. CONSTITUTIONAL FLAGS
Allowing the sentencing judge to reevaluate the charges
under a lower standard of proof raises several problems. Be-
sides the negative policy implications of undercutting the role
of the jury and undermining the finality of a jury verdict, it also
raises certain constitutional flags-namely, due process and
double jeopardy.
22 See Kirchner, supra note 7, at 815. Not only is the standard of proof lower at sen-
tencing, but neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Confrontation Clause ap-
ply. See Lear, supra note 73, at 733 ("Even though facts found at sentencing are of
great importance to the defendant, sentencing hearings remain informal events con-
ducted with little regard for procedural fairness or accuracy."). Thus, hearsay state-
ments may be the foundation of the judge's sentencing decision, and although the
defendant may be given the opportunity to contest any allegations at sentencing, he is
not entitled to a full evidentiary hearing. Lear, supra note 7, at 1201. As a result, the
defendant is denied protections he would have been entitled to had he been tried on
the relevant conduct. Greenwald, supra note 14, at 545.
22 SeeLear, supra note 7, at 1222-28 ("[Tlhe drafters doubtless expected the jury to
provide a powerful defense against the overzealous prosecutor and the corrupt judge
and perhaps against abuses by the national lawmaking power as well.").
2" SeeJohnson, supra note 46, at 184.
227 Id at 185. The jury expresses the "conscience of the community," investing the
criminal law with a moral force it would otherwise not have. Benjamin E. Rosenberg,
Criminal Acts and Sentencing Facts: Two Constitutional Limits on Criminal Sentencing, 23
SETON HALL L. REv. 459, 474 (1993). The jury system impresses upon the criminal
defendant and the community as a whole that a verdict is given in accordance with
the law by persons who are fair. Id. at 482. Basing a sentence on factors for which the
jury has acquitted the defendant undermines the appearance of fairness. Id.
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1. Due Process Concerns
First, there is a due process concern with the standard of
proof.2 8 The Supreme Court has held that proof by a prepon-
derance of the evidence2 29 is constitutionally sufficient for sen-
tencing.2s 0 This lower standard forms the basis for the widely
used argument that a sentencing court may properly consider
acquitted conduct, as the jury's acquittal means only that the
jury did not find proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the de-
fendant was guilty of the charges.231 This does not preclude a
finding of proof of the defendant's guilt under the lower pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard.232 Therefore, ajudge can
come to a conclusion different from the jury's with regard to
the defendant's responsibility for the charged offenses.233
However, according to the Supreme Court's holding in In re
Winship, a criminal defendant is entitled to have each element
of his or her offense of conviction proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.m The Court declared that the "accused during a crimi-
nal prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance,
both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon
conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigma-
tized by the conviction."2 35  Finding that the preponderance
standard would not sufficiently protect an individual's proce-
See Boyce F. Martin, Jr., The Cornerstone Has No Foundation: Relevant Conduct in
Sentencing and the Requirements of Due Process, 3 SETON HALL CONsT. LJ. 25, 35-36
(1993).
The preponderance standard requires ajudge to find that it is more likely than
not that the defendant engaged in the conduct during the commission of the under-
lying offense of conviction. Greenwald, supra note 14, at 544-45.
' McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986). The Sentencing Commission
adopted this standard by amendment effective November 1, 1991, see USSG App. C,
amend. 387, and incorporated its approval into the Guidelines, see USSG § 6A1.3
comment. ("The Commission believes that use of a preponderance of the evidence
standard is appropriate to meet due processrequirements and policy concerns in re-
solving disputes regarding application of the guidelines to the facts of a case.").
However, in extreme cases the clear and convincing standard has been required.
United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633, 637 n.2 (1997) (per curiam). See also Green-
wald, supra note 14, at 560-63.
231 See Kirchner, supra note 7, at 811.
232 Id
233 id
24 In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[W]e explicitly hold that the Due Pro-
cess Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.").
2 Id. at 363.
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dural rights, the Winship Court concluded that the reasonable
doubt standard was necessary to maintain public confidence in
the criminal justice system. 6 In Winship, the Court said that ad-
judging someone guilty and imprisoning her for years on the
same strength of evidence as would suffice in a civil case would
amount to a lack of fundamental fairness.23 Yet, when a sen-
tencing judge enhances a defendant's sentence this is exactly
what occurs-the defendant is imprisoned for a greater number
of years based only on a preponderance of the evidence.
While it has been held that proof by a preponderance of the
evidence is enough to satisfy the requirements of due process
for sentencing purposes, elements of an offense should not be
before the sentencing judge in the first instance. It is within the
province of the jury to decide whether or not the Government
has carried its burden on the elements of an offense.23 If the
jury acquits, then the issue is settled.23 9 The judge does not have
the power to issue a judgment of guilt notwithstanding an ac-
quittal by thejury.240 Allowing a judge to circumvent a jury ver-
2 Id. at 361-64.
27 Id at 363.
A fact may be both an element of a crime and a specific offense characteristic.
See Rosenberg, supra note 227, at 469. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) makes it a
crime to use or carry a weapon in connection with certain crimes and USSG §
2D1.1 (b) (1) provides for a sentencing enhancement where the defendant used or
displayed a weapon in connection with the crime of conviction. Where the jury ac-
quits on the charge of possession of a firearm under the statutory offense, the judge
will often reexamine the question of possession of a firearm for the purposes of en-
hancing a defendant's sentence under the Guidelines. Thus, where the jury has
evaluated the evidence with regard to the offense and decided not to convict, the
trier has an additional opportunity to review the same facts for sentencing purposes.
Under Watts, the judge may conclude that the defendant did possess a firearm and
impose punishment for the same conduct of which the jury just acquitted the defen-
dant. This process makes acquittal of the charges at trial meaningless because, by
employment of the Sentencing Guidelines, punishment can be exactly what it would
have been had the defendant been convicted of the charges. See Rosenberg, supra, at
469.
"9 Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) ("[W]e necessarily afford absolute
finality to ajury's verdict of acquittal-no matter how erroneous its decision.").
214 See Johnson, supra note 46, at 183. However, this is effectively what happens
when the sentencing judge is permitted to review conduct relating to charges of
which the defendant has been acquitted. As Professor Johnson states, "[A]llowing
sentence enhancement for acquitted conduct is tantamount to permitting the judge
to enter, for sentencing purposes, ajudgment of guilt notwithstanding the verdict on
the counts of acquittal, an action which is barred as inconsistent with the Sixth
Amendment right to trial byjury." Id. at 183.
A telling example is found in United States v. Juarez-Ortega, in which the following
exchange occurred:
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dict, by use of the preponderance of evidence standard no
less,24' is fundamentally at odds with our system ofjustice
The Court: The jury could not have made-the jury could not have listened to
the instructions.
Counsel: Your Honor,--
The Court: The testimony was so strong. The gun was even in the apartment.
That's all they needed. There was no dispute of that fact. The mere fact that
that gun was in the apartment, being used in association with-he didn't have to
have it on his person.
Counsel: They perhaps didn't believe it was being used in association with drug-
related activity, your Honor.
The Court: Well, I'll tell you something- I have been disappointed injury ver-
dicts before, but that's one of the most important ones, because what it did, it set
up a disparity in result between the two defendants. Your client was consistently
selling cocaine from his apartment and using a firearm. The fact is that the offi-
cers came in and testified that it was in your client's waistband and described,
had an officer on the stand, a man who is an ATF agent, who is capable and
knows what a firearm looks like, telling them, "This is what I saw."... They had
to absolutely disregard the testimony of a government agent for no reason-no
reason.
Counsel: Perhaps they considered the testimony of the other agent who testified
that he couldn't be sure, your Honor.
The Court: Well, you can take it up with an appellate court because I've made my
findings on the record.
United States v.Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d 747, 748-49 (5th Cir. 1989). The Fifth Circuit
affirmed without objection. Id. at 747.
24 As the Winship Court noted:
The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of
criminal procedure.... (A] person ... would be at a severe disadvantage, a dis-
advantage amounting to a lack of fundamental fairness, if he could be adjudged
guilty and imprisoned for years on the strength of the same evidence as would
suffice in a civil case.
Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
242 See Kirchner, supra note 7, at 814; see also Lear, supra note 73, at 757 (the jury
becomes dislodged from its "crucial oversight role" in the criminal justice system and
is rendered "powerless to protect the citizen from the overzealous prosecutor or the
unscrupulous judge.").
In defending the use of the preponderance standard, it has been suggested that
a convicted criminal is entitled to less process than a presumptively innocent defen-
dant. See Greenwald, supra note 14, at 544; see also Lear, supra note 7, at 1214-16.
Once a person is convicted, the theory goes, he or she no longer deserves the protec-
tions concomitant with a presumption of innocence and is subject to any range of
imprisonment up to the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction. See Lear,
supra note 7, at 1214. (The Court offered this logic in Meachum v. Farw, 427 U.S. 215
(1976), concluding that a conviction deprives a defendant of his liberty interest to the
full extent of the law. While Meachum was a pre-Guidelines case, the reasoning carries
over.) Under this theory, the sentencing court does not violate the defendant's due
process rights so long as the sentence imposed is within the statutory maximum. See
Lear, supra note 7, at 1218. Professor Lear explains, "[t]his formula presumes that
the very act of designating a maximum punishment presumptively vests the state with
839
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The argument against allowing a sentencing court to con-
sider acquitted conduct has been described as "emotionally
charged . . . spring[ing] more from a common-sense recogni-
tion of the 'unfairness' involved rather than from the legal fine
points of precedent and statutory construction. ', 243  Fairness,
however, is at the core of the Due Process Clause. 4 It belies
fairness when, upon acquittal of a crime, a defendant receives
the exact sentence he would have received had he been con-
victed of that crime. And yet the Watts Court accepted this re-
sult.24 5  Precedent can be overturned or explained away and
statutes can be amended, but fairness as embodied in our Con-
stitution can no more be tiptoed around than it can be ignored.
2. Double Jeopardy Concerns
Not only is due process at issue, but the specter of double
jeopardy is also disturbing. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment protects individuals from multiple prosecu-
tions for the same offense.2 4 6 The Supreme Court has declared
that the Double Jeopardy Clause "protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects
against a second prosecution for the same offense after convic-
tion. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same
offense." 247 Therefore, to the extent that the judge's considera-
tion of acquitted conduct amounts to a second review of the
that amount of the defendant's liberty upon conviction, rendering the legislature's,
or court's, choice of sentencing factors irrelevant to the due process analysis." I&
Professor Lear adds that while this theory historically has been justified by the argu-
ment that since the state can punish to the extent of the statutory maximum anything
less represents the dispensation of grace, nowhere in the criminal code does it say the
judge must start at the top and work his way down. Id. at 1219. Rather, indetermi-
nate sentencing, like the Guidelines, was conceived to allow judges to pick an appro-
priate sentence from within a range of possibilities. Id.
243 See Kirchner, supra note 7, at 814-15.
244 See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64 (1967) (explaining that "the Due
Process Clause guarantees the fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal trial").
24 5See United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633, 640-41 (1997) (per curiam) (Petitioner
Putra's sentencing range after the consideration of the acquitted conduct was identi-
cal to what the sentencing range would have been had she been convicted on that
count.).
246 SeeJohnson, supra note 46, at 181. The Fifth Amendment states in part: "nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
247 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
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same offense resulting in additional punishment, the Fifth
Amendment squarely prohibits it.
248
The rule that a defendant may not be retried following an
acquittal is the "most fundamental rule in the history of double
jeopardy jurisprudence."2 9 This reflects "both an institutional
interest in preserving the finality of judgments, and a strong
public interest in protecting individuals against government
overreaching."250 Unlike uncharged conduct, acquitted conduct
has already been formally adjudicated. Thus, the use of acquit-
ted conduct is tantamount to a redetermination by the sentenc-
ing judge.s 1 Changing the standard of proof does not make it
more permissible to reconsider an acquittal for the purposes of
imposing criminal punishment.
There are at least two arguments against this conclusion.
The first argument is that double jeopardy is not implicated be-
cause the court is not punishing the defendant for the acquitted
conduct; rather the court is merely considering the acquitted
conduct in relation to the offense of conviction. In other
words, courts make a distinction between a "sentence" and a
"sentence enhancement."s 53  The sentencing enhancement is
not considered punishment for the acquitted conduct, but for
the substantive offense of conviction. Thus, although the
Double Jeopardy Clause prevents courts from imposing a sepa-
rate sentence based on the acquitted conduct, it does not pro-
hibit them from using acquitted conduct to enhance a sentence
based on a separate conviction because the defendant is being
neither punished nor tried for the acquitted offense.2s
20s See Kirchner, supra note 7, at 819.
219 United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977).
20Dowling v. Uniied States, 493 U.S. 342, 355 (1990) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
"' SeeJohnson, supra note 46, at 157 n.14.
2 United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633, 636 (1997) (per curiam).
'3 See Kirchner, supra note 7, at 813. This differentiation is sometimes called the
"punishment-enhancement distinction." See, e.g., Lear, supra note 73, at 726. This
distinction derives from McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 312 (1901), in which
the Supreme Court concluded that the prior-conviction enhancement did not consti-
tute a second punishment for the earlier offense; rather, it only served to amplify the
seriousness of the current offense, thusjustifying a more serious sentence. Later Su-
preme Court decisions extended the punishment-enhancement distinction. See, e.g.,
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986); United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41
(1978).
".. See Lear, supra note 73, at 726.
" Id. See also Kirchner, supra note 7, at 813.
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This is, however, a distinction without a difference. 6 The
end result for the defendant is the same-his punishment will
be increased due to the consideration of the acquitted con-
duct.2 7 Whether labeled as "enhancement" or "punishment," a
longer sentence is a serious restriction on the defendant's free-
dom;25 hence, it violates his constitutional rights. It is immate-
rial that the additional punishment for the sentencing
enhancement may perhaps constitute less than the punishment
available had the defendant actually been convicted.
The second counter-argument points out that finding a vio-
lation of double jeopardy requires courts to equate the sentenc-
ing hearing with a trial or prosecution.29 Some argue that it
would be implausible to do this without dragging the full pano-
ply of procedural requirements in tow.260 However, this does not
necessarily follow. It is not particularly unusual for the courts to
limit the application of a law to specific contexts. In fact, in the
context of sentencing, many rights and rules are already selec-
tively applied.26'
The Double Jeopardy Clause not only protects individuals, it
also safeguards important systemic goals.2  It preserves the fi-
nality of judicial decisions, which, in turn, conserves judicial re-
sources and ensures that court proceedings "command the
respect and confidence of the public."263 Further, the Double
Jeopardy Clause functions to protect the integrity of the crimi-
nal justice system as a whole by preventing harassment and in-
216 See Kirchner, supra note 7, at 820-21. In Rodriguez-Gonzalez, the Second Circuit
used the punishment-enhancement fiction to reject a double jeopardy challenge
against the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing. United States v. Rodriguez-
Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177, 181 (2d Cir. 1990). The court noted: "Of course, from the
point of view of the defendant receiving added prison time because of the presence
of a gun, the distinction may be academic. But the analysis is crucial in considering
the double jeopardy argument." Id.
25 See Kirchner, supra note 7, at 820-21.
m See Lear, supra note 7, at 1185.
2'9 See Lear, supra note 73, at 756. The historical distinction between trial and sen-
tencing has formed the linchpin of constitutional review of sentencing practices.
Lear, supra note 7, at 1208.
26 See Lear, supra note 73, at 756.
2 For example, the Confrontation Clause is not implicated at sentencing, but the
right to counsel is constitutionally mandated. See Lear, supra note 7, at 1219 n.199.
Furthermore, while the use of prior convictions is unconstitutional, the inclusion of
offenses that were never even charged is permissible. Id.
22 See Lear, supra note 73, at 746.
263 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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consistent results.2 64 The use of acquitted conduct undermines
both finality and public trust in the system.
When the legislature statutorily classifies specific conduct as
criminal, it can only punish that behavior by recourse to the
criminal justice system established by the Constitution.2 " A con-
viction is a necessary prerequisite to punishment based on that
conduct.26 While not always an accurate barometer of factual
guilt, conviction symbolizes legal guilt, thereby legitimizing the
government's authority to deprive a person of his life, liberty or
property.27 Acquittal may not prove factual innocence, but nei-
ther does it establish the legal guilt necessary to authorize
criminal punishment.
C. THE ROLE OF THE SENTENCING COMMISSION
Finally, the Watts269 Court did not address whether the Sen-
tencing Commission has the authority to amend the Guidelines
to limit or forbid the consideration of acquitted conduct in sen-
tencing. While the Sentencing Commission was created as an
agency within the judicial branch of the United States govern-
ment, it reports directly to Congress whose members then re-
view its recommendations. 270  The Sentencing Commission's
duties from day one have been effectively to design legislation
for the federal courts.27 ' Furthermore, the Sentencing Reform
Act of 198472 directed the Commission to present regularly
4 id.
6 SeeLear, supra note 7, at 1222.
26Id. See also id. at 1236-37 ("The jury represents the collective conscience of the
community. A finding of guilt by the community gives validity to the sanction; it adds
a special and irreplaceable dimension of fairness to the deprivation of an individual's
liberty.").
' Id. at 1222.
2' As Professor Lear phrased it: "In the absence of a conviction, the government
lacks constitutional authority to exact punishment for allegedly criminal conduct."
Id.
2" United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633 (1997) (per curiam).
70 USSG Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro, comment.
'' Id. ("Its principal purpose is to establish sentencing policies and practices for
the federal criminal justice system that will assure the ends ofjustice by promulgating
detailed guidelines prescribing the appropriate sentences for offenders convicted of
federal crimes."). See also Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996) (holding that in
fulfilling its congressional mandate to measure and monitor the effectiveness of vari-
ous sentencing, penal, and correctional practices, the Commission has the authority
to promulgate, review, and revise binding guidelines).
See supra notes 6-21 and accompanying text.
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amendments to Congress. 273 Therefore, it seems that the Com-
mission does possess the authority to propose any amendment it
likes and submit it to Congress for review.274 Moreover, the
Court itself has suggested that the Commission's authority to re-
vise the Guidelines reduces the need for judicial intervention to
resolve circuit conflicts. 75
In creating the Commission, Congress "delegate [d] broad
authority.., to review and rationalize the federal sentencing
process. 276  The Commission initially could have adopted a
charge offense system which essentially would have barred re-
view of acquitted conduct.277 By adopting a modified real of-
fense system instead, the Commission has not relinquished its
authority to exclude factors from judicial consideration.278
In Watts, Justice Scalia argued that § 3661 prohibits the
Commission from amending acquitted conduct beyond consid-
eration of the sentencing judge.2 9 If this is correct, then much
of the Guidelines would already be invalid, or at the very least
inconsistent with § 3661, because the Guidelines already place
numerous limitations and restrictions on the information a sen-
tencing court may consider.280 For example, with regard to of-
2 USSG Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro, comment. ("The Commission has the authority to
submit guideline amendments each year to Congress between the beginning of a
regular Congressional session and May 1. Such amendments automatically take effect
180 days after submission unless a law is enacted to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 994
(p) .").-
7 Id. (The Commission "expects and the governing statute anticipates, that con-
tinuing research, experience, and analysis will result in modifications and revisions to
the guidelines through submission of amendments to Congress.").
27 See Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348-49 (1991).
276 USSG Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro, comment. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (1994) (The Com-
mission "periodically shall review and revise, in consideration of comments and data
coming to its attention, the guidelines promulgated pursuant to the provision of this
section.").
2' SeeJohnson, supra note 46, at 187 (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 994 set out in detail
the duties of the Commission, but did not specify the model on which the Guidelines
were to be based); see also discussion of sentencing models, supra notes 62-81 and ac-
companying text.
276 SeeJohnson, supra note 46, at 187.
27 United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633, 638 (1997) (ScaliaJ., concurring).
20 In fact, Congress directed the Commission to design guidelines reflecting "the
general inappropriateness of considering the education, vocational skills, employ-
ment record, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties of the defendant."
28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (1994). See also id. § 994(d) ("The Commission shall assure that
the Guidelines and policy statements are entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national
origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders.").
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fender characteristics, the defendant's age,2"' education,282 men-
tal and emotional condition,283 physical condition including
2845drug or alcohol abuse,"' employment record,2s family and
community ties,2s and prior good works in the community28 7 or-
dinarily are not relevant in determining whether a sentence
should be outside the applicable guideline range.2' Nor are
race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, or socio-economic
status normally relevant.2  Yet clearly Justice Scalia does not be-
lieve that the Guidelines are insupportable due to these restric-
tions: in his Mistretta dissent he explained that the Guidelines
"have the force and effect of laws... A judge who disregards
them will be reversed."m
Amending the Guidelines to clarify its position on acquitted
conduct is not a novel idea to the Commission. The Commis-
sion developed, considered and rejected amendments which
would have restricted use of acquitted conduct under the
Guidelines in both the 1992-93 and 1993-94 amendment cy-
cles.2' The Commission did not consider the issue the following
year,22 but earmarked it as a priority issue for the 1996-97
amendment cycle. 3 In fact, just days before the Watts decision
came down, the Commission had published for comment sev-
eral potential options with regard to modifying the treatment of
acquitted conduct. 4 Hopefully, the Court's decision in Watts
2' See USSG § 5H1.1.
212 See id. § 5H1.2.
2' See iL § 5HI.3.
2" See id. § 5H1.4.
20 See id. § 5H1.5.
'6 See id. § 5HI.6.
287 See id. § 5H1.11.
2 See d. at Ch. 5.
29 See id. § 5H1.10.
m United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See
aso Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2044 (1996) (finding that § 3661 is not of-
fended by the provisions in the Guidelines that proscribe use of certain offender
characteristics).
2" See 57 Fed. Reg. 62, 832 (Dec. 31, 1992); 58 Fed. Reg. 67522, 67541 (Dec. 21,
1993).
SeeJohnson, supra note 46, at 189 n. 213.
298 See 61 Fed. Reg. 34,465 (July 2, 1996).
214 See 62 Fed. Reg. 152, 161-62 (Jan. 2, 1997). The Commission decided to publish
the proposed amendments for comment during its July 18, 1996 meeting. The
United States Sentencing Commission, Upcoming Meeting Info (visited Oct. 27, 1997)
<http://www.ussc.gov>. However, in December, 1996 the Commission voted not to
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
will not deter the Commission from further pursuing its posi-
don on the use of acquitted conduct in sentencing-even if it
happens to differ from the Court's conclusion.
VI. CONCLUSION
In United States v. Watts, the Court failed to reevaluate thor-
oughly the implications of using acquitted conduct in sentenc-
ing under the recently promulgated Sentencing Guidelines.
The use of acquitted conduct in sentencing raises matters of
constitutional magnitude which the Court should have ad-
dressed. Even if the Court ultimately provides a well-reasoned
opinion finding that due process and double jeopardy are not
offended by the use of acquitted conduct, the Sentencing
Commission, considering the negative policy implications of
undermining the jury verdict and the finality of a finding of in-
nocence, should still be able to amend the Guidelines to restrict
or forbid the use of acquitted conduct.
ERICA K. BEUTLER
put any amendments with regard to acquitted conduct to Congress for the 1996-97
amendment cycle (for the 1996-97 cycle the Commission presented its proposed
amendments to Congress on May 1, 1997). Id.
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